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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
  
 In this case, the buyer of a chemical plant has sued 
the seller under state law and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, for costs incurred in abating contamination 
at the site.  The district court, applying federal common law, 
held that the sale agreement between the parties did not clearly 
relieve the seller from a duty to contribute and, after a trial, 
entered judgment for the buyer.  We conclude that state law 
governs the interpretation of the contract and requires 
consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities.  We 
agree with the district court that the parties are not entitled 
to a jury trial under CERCLA.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
judgment in favor of the buyer and remand for a hearing on the 
contractual issues.   
 In 1959, W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn. acquired a chemical 
manufacturing business in Fords, New Jersey.  Grace owned and 
operated the plant until 1978 when it sold the operation to the 
straw-parties that, in turn, transferred the business to Hatco 
Corporation, whose sole shareholder was and is Alex Kaufman.1 
 Kaufman had worked at the Fords site for over twenty 
years and served as the president of Grace's chemical division 
there from 1962 until the sale in 1978.  At the time of the sale, 
the site was polluted by the manufacturing operations that had 
                     
1
.  The parties have made no distinction between Hatco and its 
corporate predecessors to whom Grace had originally sold the 
plant.  We will therefore treat Hatco as if it were the original 
purchaser. 
  
been carried on over the years.  Additional contamination 
occurred during the subsequent years when Hatco owned the 
facility. 
 Under pressure from state authorities, Hatco undertook 
cleanup operations at the site and then sued for reimbursement of 
sums expended, alleging liability against Grace under CERCLA and 
the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act ("Spill Act"), 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 58:10-23.11 to -23.24.  Contending that Hatco 
had assumed responsibility for cleanup in the 1978 agreement of 
sale, Grace moved for summary judgment.  Hatco filed a cross-
motion on the same issue.  The district court denied Grace's 
motion on that issue and granted Hatco's, concluding that the 
agreement, as a matter of law, did not unambiguously shield Grace 
from Hatco's claim for reimbursement. 
   In a nonjury trial, the district court found both Grace 
and Hatco responsible under the New Jersey Spill Act and CERCLA.  
The court apportioned the cleanup costs between the two companies 
based on a number of factors and entered judgment in favor of 
Hatco and against Grace in the amount of $9,269,892.41, plus 
prejudgment interest of $2,919,885.75, for a total of 
$12,189,778.16.  The proceedings before the district court have 
been chronicled in a series of published opinions.2 
                     
2
.  Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 859 F. Supp. 769 
(D.N.J. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 849 F. 
Supp. 987 (D.N.J. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 
849 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--
Conn., 836 F. Supp. 1049 (D.N.J. 1993), modified, 849 F. Supp. 
987 (D.N.J. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 801 F. 
Supp. 1334 (D.N.J. 1992); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 
801 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.J. 1992). 
  
 Although unresolved claims between the parties remain 
(including potential insurance coverage), the court entered final 
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  Grace has appealed, 
raising a number of issues, one of which we find is dispositive 
of this appeal.  
 I. 
 Under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e), "agreements to 
indemnify or hold harmless are enforceable between [private] 
parties but not against the government."  Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 
1988); accord Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 211 
(3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1696 (1995).  Although 
these private agreements cannot nullify a party's underlying 
CERCLA liability, they are effective to shift the ultimate 
financial loss.  Beazer, 34 F.3d at 211; Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. 
Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 Grace contends that it is not required to reimburse 
Hatco for cleaning up the Fords site because in the agreement of 
sale between the parties, Hatco assumed the obligation of 
satisfying any environmental obligations.  Following its earlier 
opinion in Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345 
(D.N.J. 1991), the district court held that in order to create a 
duty to indemnify under federal common law, "an unmistakable 
intent to do so must be expressed in unambiguous terms or be 
clearly implied."  Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 801 F. 
Supp. 1309, 1318 (D.N.J. 1992).   
  
 However, some months after this appeal was taken, we 
held that agreements among private parties inter se addressing 
the allocation of responsibility for CERCLA claims are to be 
interpreted by incorporating state, not federal, law.  Fisher 
Dev. Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 37 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Tippins, Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 91 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Beazer, 34 F.3d at 215.  We have also decided that, given 
appropriate language, a pre-CERCLA agreement can be effective for 
claims arising after the statute became effective.  Fisher, 37 
F.3d at 110; Beazer, 34 F.3d at 211.   
 The sale agreement before us provides that its terms 
are to be interpreted by the laws of New York.  Under that 
state's law, the assignment of the burden of proof depends upon 
whether the agreement in question is characterized as a "release" 
or as an "indemnity" contract.  Compare, e.g., Structural 
Painting Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 451 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (burden of establishing intent of parties 
is assigned to releasor) with Walsh v. Morse Diesel, Inc., 533 
N.Y.S.2d 80, 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (burden of establishing 
intent of parties is assigned to indemnitee).   
 In the case before us, the district court and the 
parties on appeal have used the terms "release" and "indemnity" 
interchangeably.  Under the Mobay standard, perhaps that made no 
difference, but it is otherwise under Beazer.  As we remarked in 
a CERCLA context, the effect of a release is to shield the 
beneficiary of that agreement from liability rather than to shift 
  
its responsibility to another as is the case of a contract to 
indemnify.  Fisher, 37 F.3d at 112. 
 New York law specifies that an indemnity agreement be 
strictly construed and that a clear and unmistakable intent to 
indemnify be manifested in the contract.  Heimbach v. 
Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 553 N.E.2d 242, 246 (N.Y. 1990).  If 
the parties' intent is not clear from the writing, the court must 
consider extrinsic evidence.  Commander Oil v. Advance Food Serv. 
Equip., 991 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New York law); 
Seiden Assocs., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 430 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (applying New York law); General Mills, Inc. v. 
Filmtel Int'l Corp., 599 N.Y.S.2d 820, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).  
 However, under state law, the agreement here may be 
more accurately characterized as a release.  "To constitute a 
release, a writing must contain an expression of a present 
intention to renounce a claim."  Carpenter v. Machold, 447 
N.Y.S.2d 46, 46-47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (citation omitted).   
"No particular form need be used in drafting a release . . . ."  
Pratt Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Mastropole, 414 N.Y.S.2d 783, 
784 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).  Indeed, "[a]ny words may be used, as 
long as they manifest the releasor's intent to discharge.  The 
parties' intent will determine the scope of a release."  Bank of 
Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Gillaizeau, 766 F.2d 709, 713 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (applying New York law) (citations omitted). 
 Releases are governed by principles of contract law.  
Mangini v. McClurg, 249 N.E.2d 386, 389 (N.Y. 1969).  Whether an 
agreement is ambiguous is a question of law for the court, W.W.W. 
  
Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990), 
to be determined by looking to the document as a whole rather 
than to sentences or clauses in isolation.  Williams Press, Inc. 
v. State, 335 N.E.2d 299, 302 (N.Y. 1975).  If an ambiguity in 
the document prevents a firm conclusion that an agreement is a 
release, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to resolve that 
question of fact.  Gillaizeau, 766 F.2d at 713-15; see also Green 
v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (circumstances sufficient to raise issue of 
fact as to parties' intent permit extrinsic evidence as aid to 
interpretation of a release). 
 A factor to be considered in determining whether an 
agreement is a "release" or an "indemnity" is the type of claim 
asserted in the litigation.  "An action for the breach of an 
indemnity agreement does not arise until [a party] has suffered 
damage by reason of the breach."  Eliseo v. Stan Margolin 
Assocs., Inc, 572 N.Y.S.2d 831, 831-32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) 
(citation omitted).3   
 In Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 
1970), we interpreted New York law in construing a contract for 
the sale of a business and distinguished between agreements of 
indemnity and those of assumption.  We held that the language of 
                     
3
.  Although a claim for indemnity does not arise until the prime 
obligation to pay has been established, some third-party actions 
may be commenced in the interest of judicial economy before they 
are technically ripe.  Mars Assocs., Inc. v. New York City Educ. 
Constr. Fund, 513 N.Y.S.2d 125, 133 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal 
dism'd as interlocutory, 514 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1987). 
  
the contract was "that of assumption not of indemnification" and 
that "one who assumes a liability, as distinguished from one who 
agrees to indemnify against it, takes the obligation of the 
transferor unto himself . . . ."  Id. at 651. 
 Although various canons may dictate that an ambiguous 
agreement is to be construed against one of the parties,4 such 
rules are of little consequence when the agreement in question 
has been "negotiated at arm's length between the representatives 
of two sophisticated business entities."  Hogeland v. Sibley, 
Lindsay & Curr Co., 366 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1977). 
 The burden of proof rests on the releasor to establish 
that general language in the document was meant to be limited "or 
otherwise does not represent the intent of the parties."  
Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 390; see also Olin Corp. v. Consolidated 
Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 16 n.4 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New 
York law); Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1462 (applying New York law).  
"[T]he burden of proof is not a necessary concomitant of the 
burden of pleading" an affirmative defense.  Hill v. St. Clare's 
Hosp., 490 N.E.2d 823, 830 (N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted).  
"Thus the burden of proof as to the validity of a release is on 
the defendant who pleads it, but a releasor who seeks to limit 
                     
4
.  For example, in New York, an ambiguous contract usually is 
construed most strongly against the drafter when the other party 
has had no voice in the preparation.  Jacobson v. Sassower, 489 
N.E.2d 1283, 1284 (N.Y. 1985).  By contrast, a release is 
construed most strongly against the releasor.  Mt. Read Terminal, 
Inc. v. LeChase Constr. Corp., 396 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1977). 
  
the effect of a release because of a claimed mutual mistake has 
the burden of proof on that issue."  Id. (citations omitted). 
 II. 
 With this survey of New York law, we now turn our 
attention to the dispute at hand.  The relevant language in the 
agreement is:  "[Hatco] hereby assumes and agrees to . . . 
discharge" certain obligations of Grace.  The agreement has been 
invoked by Grace, which has not expended any sums for cleanup and 
makes no claim for them.  Hence, Grace has no basis for indemnity 
at this point, but in reality is seeking to shield itself from 
Hatco's claim for reimbursement. 
 Hatco is attempting to recover sums it spent to meet 
Grace's asserted liability.  However, if the agreement is 
enforceable, it acts to relieve Grace from payment for matters 
that Hatco had taken over itself when the parties executed the 
assumption agreement in 1978.  Indeed, as the district court 
pointed out, to the extent a document of that nature "prevents a 
purchaser from asserting a CERCLA claim against the seller, the 
agreement can be viewed as a `release.'"  Hatco, 801 F. Supp. at 
1317.  We are in accord with this comment of the district court, 
and we shall treat the agreement as a release. 
 In diversity cases, the burden of proof is a matter of 
substantive law, Blair v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 296, 
299 (3d Cir. 1982), and is not controlled by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(c), which governs releases pled as affirmative defenses.  See 
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).  We recognize that 
the present dispute is not a diversity case, but because the 
  
parties here have chosen to have their agreement interpreted in 
accordance with New York law, we will apply that state's 
substantive law on the burden of proof.  See Olin, 5 F.3d at 16 
n.4; Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1462.  Because it contends that the 
terms of the agreement are unclear, we conclude that the proper 
course is to require Grace to bear the burden of producing 
evidence bearing on ambiguity.  Hatco, though, as the releasor 
seeking to limit the effect of the release, bears the burden of 
persuasion on the effect of that agreement. 
 In reviewing the agreement, the district court used a 
very strict criterion articulated as simply, "No clear 
expression, no indemnity."  Hatco, 801 F. Supp. at 1321.  In 
other words, the district court opined that matters extrinsic to 
the agreement are irrelevant to the indemnity inquiry.  However, 
when a writing is ambiguous, New York cases require the admission 
of extrinsic evidence to establish or disprove the intent of the 
parties. 
 The assumption agreement that Hatco executed 
specifically incorporated the sale agreement and read in 
pertinent part: 
  "1.  [Hatco] hereby assumes and agrees 
to pay and discharge in due course all 
liabilities of [Grace] attributable to the 
Chemical Business listed in Exhibit A to this 
instrument, and [Hatco] hereby assumes and 
agrees to perform and fulfill all obligations 
of [Grace] attributable to the Chemical 
Business . . . . 
 
  2.  [Hatco also] agrees to indemnify 
[Grace] and to save and hold [Grace] harmless 
from and against any and all damage, 
liability, [or] loss . . . arising out of or 
  
resulting from any failure by [Hatco] duly to 
perform or fulfill any agreement set forth in 
this instrument." 
 
 Liabilities and obligations of Grace attributable to 
the chemical business and assumed by Hatco were defined in 
relevant part as follows: 
  "(b)  [Hatco assumes] the following 
obligations and liabilities existing on the 
date of the Closing, or in the case of those 
described in clause (iv), arising thereafter 
. . . : 
 
  (i)  obligations with respect to sales 
orders accepted by the Chemical Business, 
other than Excluded Liabilities; 
 
  (ii)  obligations for goods and services 
ordered by the Chemical Business, other than 
Excluded Liabilities; 
 
  (iii)  liabilities and obligations with 
respect to capital expenditures described in 
any Request for Capital Appropriation 
approved in accordance with [Grace's] 
customary procedures by the management of the 
Chemical Business, or any management group of 
[Grace] senior thereto; 
 
  (iv)  other obligations and liabilities 
arising in the ordinary course of the 
Chemical Business, whether prior to or after 
the date of the Closing, other than Excluded 
Liabilities; 
 
  (v)  other liabilities and obligations 
of which Alex Kaufman or David G. Seabrook[5] 
has actual present personal knowledge and 
awareness at the date of the Sale Agreement, 
other than Excluded Liabilities; 
 
                     
5
.  Seabrook served as a financial analyst at the Fords plant at 
one time and as one of the principal negotiators for Hatco in its 
purchase of the facility in 1978. 
  
  (vi)  other liabilities and obligations 
which do not exceed $5,000 per item and 
$50,000 in the aggregate, other than Excluded 
Liabilities."  (emphasis added). 
 The "Excluded Liabilities" that Hatco did not assume 
were listed in specific detail and fell into a number of 
categories, including two pending law suits, a potential personal 
injury claim, and the "[a]lleged pollution of Sling Tail Brook on 
or about May 31, 1977." 
 "Chemical business" was defined as "that business 
presently conducted by [Grace] comprising the manufacture and 
sale of plasticisers and synthetic lubricants . . . at Fords, New 
Jersey."  The sale agreement tracked the language and 
specifications set out in the assumption agreement. 
 A. 
 Grace contends that the pollution at the Fords site is 
included within the phrase "other obligations and liabilities 
arising in the ordinary course of the Chemical Business" and thus 
is within the scope of clause (iv).  The district court rejected 
that argument and relied on Haynes v. Kleinewefers & Lembo Corp., 
921 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1990) for support.  In that case, the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that contractual 
provisions -- identical in some respects to those of the case at 
hand but in an indemnity setting -- were unambiguous.  In Haynes, 
the purchaser of a business sought to recover amounts it had paid 
to settle the personal injury claim of its employee who was 
injured by a defective machine previously owned by the seller.  
  
The Court held that the purchaser was entitled to indemnity 
because the injury did not occur "in the ordinary course of 
business," a factor that the contractual language required as a 
prerequisite to absolving the seller. 
 The Haynes court, relying on the general rule of 
construction, ejusdem generis, concluded that "[f]ollowing an 
enumeration of particular classes `other' must be read as `other 
such like,' and includes only others of like kind and character."  
Id. at 457 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 992 (5th ed. 1979)).  
The court thus construed the phrase "other obligations and 
liabilities arising in the ordinary course of business" as 
including matters similar to those previously enumerated in the 
same paragraph -- such as orders for sales that had been accepted 
by the seller, orders for goods or services, and capital 
expenditures.  Id. at 458.  Because those categories were quite 
dissimilar to an incident resulting in personal injury, the court 
held that the employee's claim was not included among the 
obligations that the buyer had undertaken.  The language of the 
agreement "fail[ed] to establish clearly an unmistakable intent 
to assume an obligation to indemnify."  Id.  
 Even assuming that personal injury to an employee does 
not arise in the ordinary course of business, we nevertheless 
differ with the district court's view that Haynes governs the 
case at hand.  There are two crucial factors that set the present 
dispute apart from that in Haynes.  First, disposal of waste in 
the operation of a chemical plant is very much a function of the 
day-to-day operation of the business.  Second, unlike the lack of 
  
a relevant intimation of personal injury claims in the Haynes 
agreement, in the one at hand, there is a specific and important 
reference to at least one environmental claim -- the Sling Tail 
Brook pollution incident. 
 If one substitutes the phrase "Alleged pollution of 
Sling Tail Brook on or about May 31, 1977" for the term "Excluded 
Liabilities" in every instance where that term appears in 
paragraph (b), the facially appealing argument that clause (iv) 
relates only to "accepted sales orders, ordered goods and 
services, and capital expenditures" falls apart.  We conclude 
that the phrase "ordinary course of the Chemical Business," 
together with the reference to an environmental claim in the 
excluded liabilities section, creates an ambiguity as to the 
scope of the assumption agreement.  Consequently, extrinsic 
evidence must be admitted to properly discern the intent of the 
parties. 
 To bolster its argument, Grace sought to show that 
during the negotiations for sale, Hatco attempted to include in 
the agreement express language excluding environmental liability, 
but that Grace refused to do so.  Although the district court 
held that extrinsic evidence was not permissible, it nevertheless 
did review Grace's contention and reasoned that it "improperly 
[sought] to reverse the burden of expression of intent."  Hatco, 
801 F. Supp. at 1321.  The court concluded that the burden of 
manifesting a clear expression of intent must fall on Grace.  Id. 
However, as we have set out in our discussion of New York law, 
the burden of demonstrating the intent of the parties falls on 
  
Hatco because it is the releasor attempting to limit the effect 
of the release. 
 B. 
 The district court also reviewed Hatco's contention 
that the agreement's definition of "Chemical Business," in 
referring to "business presently conducted," would not include 
claims arising from manufacturing operations that had been 
discontinued some time before the sale.  The court remarked that 
although it agreed with Hatco's position on the point, "Grace's 
arguments at best lead to the conclusion that the meaning of 
`Chemical Business' is ambiguous . . . ."  Id.  We agree that an 
ambiguity exists, and on this point also, extrinsic evidence 
should have been admitted. 
 C. 
 Clause (v) provides that Hatco would assume "other 
liabilities and obligations of which Alex Kaufman or David G. 
Seabrook has actual present personal knowledge and awareness at 
the date of the Sale Agreement."  The extent of those 
individuals' actual knowledge is disputed, but there seems to be 
little doubt that they were both aware of actual or potential 
environmental problems in 1978.  As noted earlier, Hatco 
unsuccessfully sought to insert in the agreement specific 
disclaimers of liability for such risks. 
 The district court concluded that CERCLA liabilities 
did not exist at the time of the sale and, therefore, clause (v) 
did not establish that Hatco had assumed them.  As the court 
viewed the situation, "liability" necessarily indicated "a legal 
  
relationship between the liable party and the party to whom it is 
liable."  Id. at 1322.  According to the court, "No such legal 
relationship existed . . . until [the] enactment of CERCLA."  Id.  
Thus, the existence of facts necessary for CERCLA liability in 
the court's view was not "sufficient to constitute knowledge of 
`liabilities.'"  Id. 
 This reasoning is not consistent with the court's 
earlier pronouncement that a broad assumption of environmental 
liability pre-dating CERCLA would be effective for post-CERCLA 
claims.  Id. at 1317-18.  That conclusion was clearly correct.  
See Fisher, 37 F.3d at 110-11 n.1; Beazer, 34 F.3d at 211; 
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 309-10 
(3d Cir. 1985).6  In those cases, as well as in the one here, 
                     
6
.  See also Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Koppers Co., 40 F.3d 750, 754-55 
(5th Cir. 1994) (two leases dated 1942 and 1949 were sufficiently 
broad so as to transfer responsibility for cleanup costs, "even 
though environmental liability . . . was not specifically 
contemplated at the time of contracting") (applying Louisiana 
law); Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 
321, 326-27 (7th Cir. 1994) (1972 agreement was sufficiently 
broad so as to transfer responsibility for cleanup costs, 
agreement covered claims of "pollution or nuisance," and state 
environmental statute was enacted two years before the parties 
contracted) (applying Illinois law); Olin, 5 F.3d at 15-16 (1974 
agreement was sufficiently broad so as to transfer responsibility 
for cleanup costs "even to future unknown liabilities") (applying 
New York law); John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 
407 (1st Cir. 1993) (1959 agreement was narrow so as to preclude 
transfer of responsibility for cleanup costs because agreement 
only related to "existing" liabilities, but apparently made no 
mention of environmental liabilities) (applying Massachusetts 
law); United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1435 (10th Cir. 
1993) (1972 and 1977 agreements to transport hazardous waste were 
sufficiently broad so as to transfer responsibility for cleanup 
costs, and yet sufficiently narrow so as to preclude cross- 
indemnification) (applying Oklahoma law); AM Int'l, Inc. v. 
International Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 997 (6th Cir. 
1993) (1979 agreement, but remand was necessary to determine 
  
"[n]o such legal relationship existed . . . until [the] enactment 
of CERCLA," but despite that chronology, pre-CERCLA agreements 
were held effective. 
 The district court also commented that "Grace seems to 
forget that the CERCLA liabilities in issue were its liabilities 
to begin with."  Hatco, 801 F. Supp. at 1321.  Although these 
environmental liabilities were obviously attributable to Grace 
before the sale in 1978, we find the court's statement to be 
irreconcilable with its later conclusion that these identical 
liabilities were not "existing" on the closing date.  See id. at 
1322.  Indeed, the first step in determining whether Hatco 
assumed Grace's liabilities is whether Grace had any liabilities 
to be assumed.  
 The court similarly remarked that "[w]ithout a 
statutory or common law basis to impose responsibility, . . . it 
is too far of a stretch to characterize the existence of the 
facts as a `liability.'"  Id.  But Grace had already incurred 
potential environmental liabilities under state and federal law 
before the closing date of the 1978 assumption agreement.7  Grace 
(..continued) 
whether parties contemplated environmental liabilities despite 
the fact that the agreement apparently made no mention of 
environmental liabilities) (applying Ohio law); Polaroid Corp. v. 
Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ), Inc., 624 N.E.2d 959, 966 (Mass. 
1993) (1976 agreement was sufficiently broad so as to transfer 
responsibility for cleanup costs, and "the parties were aware of 
changing [environmental] regulations and strict liability was a 
tenable claim") (applying New Jersey law). 
7
.  The parties both limit their discussion of environmental 
liabilities to those arising under New Jersey as well as federal 
law. 
  
was responsible under state common-law and statutory provisions 
for the abatement of the environmental harm to the Fords site 
resulting from past hazardous waste disposal practices.  In 
State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 
163 (N.J. 1983), the Supreme Court of New Jersey pointed out that 
"the Spill Act [did] not so much change substantive liability as 
it establishe[d] new remedies for activities recognized as 
tortious both under prior statutes and the common law."  See also 
Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 101 & n.8 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citing T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 
1249 (N.J. 1991)); Polaroid Corp. v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ), 
Inc., 624 N.E.2d 959, 965-67 (Mass. 1993) (applying New Jersey 
law).  Because the waste disposal practices at the Fords site 
threatened the public health and the environment by leaching 
chemicals into potential sources of drinking water, corresponding 
responsibility for cleanup existed on the date of closing under 
federal theories as well.  See, e.g., United States v. Price, 688 
F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Solvents Recovery 
Serv. of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980).   
 The Mardan court's view of New York law is also 
pertinent:  "[I]f the injury is known, and the mistake [of the 
parties] is merely as to the consequence, future course, or 
sequelae of a known injury, then the release will stand."  
Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1463 (internal quotation omitted) (applying 
New York law); see also Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, 
Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 137 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying New York 
law).  In the circumstances here, it is of no practical 
  
importance whether Grace's obligation to clean up the site would 
be imposed by CERCLA, another federal statute, the common law, or 
a New Jersey statute.  In any event, the process would require 
the expenditure of substantial sums of money, and it is that 
reimbursement which Hatco seeks here.  We, therefore, do not 
accept the district court's restrictive view of the term 
"liabilities" as found in paragraph (b) of Exhibit A to the 
assumption agreement. 
 The circumstances of the sale from Grace to Hatco are 
unique in that Kaufman, the owner of Hatco, had been in charge of 
Grace's activities at the Fords facility for many years before 
the transfer of ownership.  It may be an exaggeration, but it 
makes the point to say that the buyer knew more about the plant 
and its operations than did the seller. 
 Kaufman's knowledge as of the closing date was 
discussed at length by the district court in its findings of fact 
after the trial.  The court found that Kaufman had been highly 
regarded by Grace as an organic chemist.  Hatco v. W.R. Grace & 
Co.--Conn., 836 F. Supp. 1049, 1077 (D.N.J. 1993).  He had been 
employed by Grace's predecessor in a number of capacities and, at 
one point, had been in the research and development laboratory 
that was responsible for product developments and improvements in 
the manufacturing processes.  He became plant manager and 
acquired familiarity with waste disposal practices at the 
facility.  In 1960, at his request, an engineering expert 
submitted a report on the waste water disposal practices at 
Fords. 
  
 In 1962, Kaufman became president of the division that 
operated the facility and began to spend more of his time 
acquiring new business, rather than taking a particularly active 
part in running the day-to-day operation of the Fords plant.  Id. 
at 1078.  However, he was regularly informed of any contacts with 
governmental agencies on environmental matters, other 
environmental problems at the facility, and the plant's pollution 
control expenditures.  Id. at 1079.  He received monthly reports 
on whether the Grace chemical division had been involved in any 
government proceedings pertaining to enforcement of environmental 
laws. 
 As of 1978 at the latest, Kaufman was aware of the 
increasing activity of governmental agencies in coping with the 
environmental consequences of past and present chemical 
manufacturing activities.  He was kept advised of impending 
legislation, including such federal statutes as the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629, and understood 
that those involved in the chemical business had to be concerned 
about environmental regulations. 
 These findings offer compelling reasons for determining 
the extent of Kaufman's knowledge at the time of the closing.  
Seabrook also had worked for some time at the plant before its 
sale to Hatco, and his knowledge, too, is a crucial issue.  
Without further proceedings to adequately develop those facts, 
the court will be unable to decide the meaning of clause (v). 
 D. 
  
 To resolve the ambiguities that we have discussed, it 
will be necessary that the matter be remanded to the district 
court so that it may conduct a hearing at which extrinsic 
evidence may be produced in order to determine the full scope and 
effect of the assumption agreement.  However, before concluding, 
we must determine whether this case must be tried to a jury. 
 III. 
 Grace contends that it was entitled to a jury trial on 
its CERCLA claims.  The procedural aspects of the jury trial 
issue in this record are somewhat blurred.  Rather than exploring 
the complexities, we shall assume that Grace was entitled to rely 
on the jury trial demand originally made by Hatco on the CERCLA 
claims.8  The district court denied Grace's requests, concluding 
that cost-recovery actions and claims for contribution under 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4) and 9613, are equitable in 
nature.  Hatco v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 859 F. Supp. 769, 774 
(D.N.J. 1994).  The district court ruled that cost-recovery suits 
are actions for restitution and are not triable to a jury.   
 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)(B) provides that the owner or 
operator of a facility is liable for "necessary costs of response 
incurred by any other person consistent with the national 
                     
8
.  It is questionable whether Grace's demand for a jury trial on 
its "counterclaim" was appropriate.  The assumption agreement is 
properly characterized as a release that should have been pleaded 
as an affirmative defense.  It is not a separate claim.  See 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (a defense improperly 
pleaded as a counterclaim may be treated by the court "as if 
there had been a proper designation"). 
  
contingency plan."  Judicial construction of this section 
originally created an implied right of contribution.  See Key 
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1965 (1994).  
However, a subsequent amendment to CERCLA (SARA), 42 U.S.C.  
§ 9613(f)(1) provides that "[a]ny person may seek contribution 
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under 
section 9607(a) . . . during or following any civil action under 
[that section]."  The court is permitted to allocate response 
costs under section 9613(f)(1) "using such equitable factors as 
the court determines are appropriate."  As the Supreme Court 
said, sections 9607 and 9613 provide "similar and somewhat 
overlapping remed[ies]."  Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966. 
 In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 
(3d Cir. 1992), we determined that under section 9607, an alleged 
responsible party is entitled to prove that the environmental 
harm is divisible and thus is reflected in the degree of 
liability.  On the other hand, section 9613(f)(1) allows more 
discretion to the court in allocating response costs, and factors 
other than liability may enter into apportionment.  Id. at 270 
n.29; see also United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 
1534-38 (10th Cir. 1995) (§ 9607 establishes joint and several 
responsibility on a strict liability basis; § 9613 allocates 
amounts due on equitable considerations).  Both sections are 
intertwined, and there are practical difficulties with making a 
distinction between them that would justify differing rulings on 
the availability of a jury trial.   
  
 As a general rule, the right to a jury trial is         
protected by the Seventh Amendment when the claim is a legal one, 
but not if it is equitable.  In establishing new statutory 
remedies, Congress may provide for jury trials in addition to 
those required by the Constitution.  Tull v. United States, 481 
U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191-92 
(1974).  The determination of which form of trial is applicable 
to a specific claim, however, is not always a simple one, 
particularly when the remedy is statutory and Congress has not 
stated its intention.  See the discussion in Crocker v. Piedmont 
Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 744-49 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 A. 
 The only appellate court ruling on the right to a jury 
trial in CERCLA cases is United States v. Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1987).  There, 
the Court of Appeals determined that a jury trial was not 
permitted in an action brought under section 9607 by the 
government against several individuals, alleging them to be 
jointly and severally liable for response costs.  Id. at 749.  
The Court observed that the government was asking for restitution 
of amounts that it had expended and as such was seeking a form of 
equitable relief.   
 Restitution is based on substantive liability having 
its origins in unjust enrichment or the restoration to a party in 
kind of his lost property or its proceeds.  Crocker, 49 F.3d at 
747; see also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 
(1946) (restitution is within the traditional equitable powers of 
  
the court); Restatement of Restitution § 115.  Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical's holding has been widely accepted, and Grace does 
not take issue with it on this appeal.  We are in agreement that 
a jury trial is not available in a claim brought under section 
9607. 
 B. 
 Whether a right to a jury trial exists in a claim 
grounded in section 9613(f)(1) has not been decided by any 
appellate court, but the district courts have reached conflicting 
results on the issue.9  The statute contains no references to the 
right to juries.  One district court, after performing an 
exhaustive search, found no specific comments in the legislative 
history.  See American Cyanamid Co. v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. 
Supp. 209, 212-13 (D.R.I. 1993). 
 We note that one statement in the Report of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary accompanying SARA tends to disclaim 
any congressional intent to have juries decide § 9613 matters.   
  "New subsection [9613(f)(1)] of CERCLA  
. . . ratifies current judicial decisions 
that the courts may use their equitable 
powers to apportion the costs of clean-up 
among the various responsible parties 
involved with the site.  Courts are to 
                     
9
.  Compare American Cyanamid Co. v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. 
Supp. 209, 213-15 (D.R.I. 1993); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 682 F. 
Supp. 39, 39-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) with United States v. Shaner, 
No. 85-1372, 1992 WL 154618, at **2-4 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1992) 
(unpublished opinion).  
  
resolve claims for apportionment on a case-
by-case basis pursuant to Federal common law, 
taking relevant equitable considerations into 
account.  Thus, after questions of liability 
and remedy have been resolved, courts may 
consider any criteria relevant to determining 
whether there should be an apportionment." 
131 Cong. Rec. 34,645 (1985); see also H.R. 253(III), 99th Cong., 
2d Sess. 19 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3038, 
3041-42. 
 Finding no clear indication of congressional intent to 
grant a jury trial in either the statute or the legislative 
history, we must therefore look to the constitutional guarantee 
in the Seventh Amendment.  The Supreme Court has supplied the 
formula for this largely historical review, acknowledging its 
difficulty.  "`First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-
century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the 
merger of the courts of law and equity.  Second, we examine the 
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in 
nature.'"  Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 
Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991) (quoting Chauffeurs, Teamsters & 
Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990)). 
 In In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 
F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), we were favored with an elaborate 
historical presentation by the parties.  After considering the 
various arguments, we concluded that courts determine "the legal 
  
or equitable nature of a suit by comparing it with suits actually 
tried in courts of common law or equity."  Id. at 1083. 
 The parties here have not briefed the historical phase 
of the inquiry, and we disclaim an exhaustive survey of our own 
on whether contribution in the 18th century was an equitable or 
legal remedy.  Our research, however, indicates that during the 
relevant period, contribution was an equitable remedy.  In 
reviewing various texts, we have found Joseph Story's 
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed. 1839) to be the most 
persuasive.  Conceding that, in a few cases, a common-law remedy 
of contribution existed, the author states that the  
 "more beneficial exercise of Equity 
Jurisdiction, in cases of apportionment and 
contribution, is in cases, where . . . 
charges on real estate . . . are actually 
paid off by some of the parties in interest. 
. . .  In most cases of this sort there is no 
remedy at law, from the extreme uncertainty 
of ascertaining the relative proportions, 
which different persons, having interests of 
a very different nature, quality, and 
duration, in the subject-matter, ought to 
pay."   
Id. § 483, at 461 (footnote omitted).  That comment is 
particularly applicable in CERCLA claims. 
 Justice Story also referred to opinions written by the 
highly regarded authority on equity, Chancellor Kent of New York.  
  
Id. § 469, at 449 n.2.  In Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. 
409, 415 (N.Y. Ch. 1815), Kent wrote that "[t]he object of the 
principle of contribution is equality in the support of a common 
burden . . . ."  Similarly, in Campbell v. Mesier & Dunstan, 4 
Johns. Ch. 334, 338 (N.Y. Ch. 1820), he observed that "[t]he 
doctrine of contribution is founded, not on contract, but on the 
principle, that equality of burden, as to a common right, is 
equity . . . ."   
 Chancellor Kent cited Lord Chief Baron Eyre's opinion 
in Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox's Ch. Cas. 318, 321, 29 
Eng. Rep. 1184, 1185, 2 Bos. & Pull. 270 (Ex. 1787), where it is 
said, "we shall find that contribution is bottomed and fixed on 
general principles of justice, and does not spring from contract 
. . . . [T]he doctrine of equality operates more effectually in 
this Court, than in a Court of law."  See also Stevens v. Cooper, 
1 Johns. Ch. 425, 430 (N.Y. Ch. 1815) ("It is a doctrine well 
established, that when land is charged with a burden, the charge 
ought to be equal, and one part ought not to bear more than its 
due proportion; and equity will preserve this equality by 
compelling the owner of each part to a just contribution.") 
(citing Harbert's Case, 3 Coke's Rep. 14, 76 Eng. Rep. 647 (Ex. 
1584); Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. Wms. 91, 24 Eng. Rep. 981 (M.R. 
1730)); John Adams, The Doctrine of Equity 219-25 (1st ed. 
1850).10 
                     
10
.  As the Supreme Court noted in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. 
Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 86 n.16 
(1981), the non-contribution rule of the common law is generally 
traced to Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 
  
 Although John N. Pomeroy's Treatise on Equity 
Jurisprudence § 1418, at 468 n.1 (1st ed. 1883) states that 
"jurisdiction at law has become well settled which is sufficient 
in all ordinary cases of suretyship or joint liability," he 
acknowledges that "[t]he equitable jurisdiction still remains and 
has some most important advantages."  That commentary, however, 
was written several decades after that of Justice Story.  As 
George E. Palmer explains in his work The Law of Restitution  
§ 1.5, at 31 (1978), enforcement of contribution claims by suits 
at law did not appear until early in the nineteenth century.   
 The nature of CERCLA claims has been noted by us in 
passing, "The contribution proceeding is an equitable one in 
which a court is permitted to allocate response costs based on 
factors it deems appropriate."  Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29.  In 
another context we remarked, "[T]he right of contribution from 
others is grounded in equity."  Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 
F.2d 754, 769 (3d Cir. 1985).   
 After our review of the more important authorities, we 
are of the belief that a claim for contribution of the nature 
presented in the case before us would have been entertained by a 
chancellor in equity in 1791, but not by a court at law.  That 
determination is not dispositive in and of itself because the 
claims here are brought pursuant to the terms of a statute.  As 
(..continued) 
1337 (K.B. 1799).  Because most American courts understood that 
case as a general proscription of contribution, the early common 
law in this country prohibited contribution among joint 
tortfeasors. 
  
the Supreme Court has observed, where Congress provides for 
enforcement of statutory rights in a civil suit, "a jury trial 
must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of 
the sort typically enforced in an action at law."  Curtis, 415 
U.S. at 195.  But certainly the fact that the remedy was one 
typically granted only in equity argues against a statutory 
remedy being considered as one at law.11 
 In Rex v. CIA. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 
65 (3d Cir. 1981), we observed that the Seventh Amendment issue 
presented in a case must be considered in the context of the 
congressional schema in which it arises.  As noted earlier, 
CERCLA's language and legislative history lack any evidence of 
intent to have the claims determined by a jury.  To the contrary, 
references to equity and equitable factors do appear, and we may 
assume that Congress was well aware that juries are not a feature 
of equitable trials.  It is entirely reasonable, therefore, to 
believe that Congress intended to design a remedy that would 
track traditional equity practice.  Cf. Cox v. Keystone Carbon 
Co., 861 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1988) (ERISA case) ("[W]e can 
infer that Congress knew the significance of the term equitable 
and intended that no jury be available on demand."); see also 
                     
11
.  Lord Devlin argues that the test should be whether a 
chancellor in 1791 would have exercised the power of equity to 
hear the case, not the more narrow inquiry of whether precedent 
demonstrated that such suits had actually been heard.  See 
Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment:  A 
Commentary on the Zenith Case, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1571 (1983).  It 
would seem that Lord Devlin's approach, unfortunately, would lead 
to even more uncertainty in determining the bounds of the Seventh 
Amendment.  
  
Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 637 (3d Cir. 1989) (ERISA case).  
 In the case at hand, the district court reasoned that 
because the precipitating claims under section 9607 are primarily 
equitable in nature, a claim for contribution under section 
9613(f)(1) is also essentially equitable.  Hatco, 859 F. Supp. at 
775.  The court further relied on the fact that section 
9613(f)(1) requires a court to apportion the costs between the 
parties "using such equitable factors as the court determines are 
appropriate."  Id. at 775 n.3. 
 We concur with the district court's reasoning. 
Particularly, we are impressed with the references in section 
9613(f)(1) to "equitable" factors.  This is an indication that 
the statutory action for contribution is to be a flexible remedy 
that may be based on circumstances not cognizable in nor readily 
adaptable to an action at law.  In sum, we are persuaded that an 
action for contribution under section 9613(f)(1) is essentially 
equitable.  Accord United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 
568, 572 (6th Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, we hold that in suits 
brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 or 9613(f)(1), the parties are 
not entitled to a jury trial. 
 IV. 
 The parties have raised a number of other issues not 
related to the 1978 assumption agreement.  We decline to address 
them at this juncture because the ultimate resolution of the 
assumption question could be outcome-determinative and our 
opinion on those other issues would be merely advisory.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the district court 
  
and will remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 Each party to bear its own costs. 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
 Please file the foregoing Opinion. 
 
 
     ____________________________ 
      Circuit Judge 
 
 
  
 ADDENDUM 
 
 The assumption agreement between Grace and Hatco read  
 
as follows: 
 
 
 "HATCO CHEMICAL 
 BUYER'S ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
 
 . . . [P]ursuant to the Sale Agreement and 
for valuable consideration, the receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged, 
  1.  [Hatco] hereby assumes and agrees to 
pay and discharge in due course all 
liabilities of [Grace] attributable to the 
Chemical Business listed in Exhibit A to this 
instrument, and [Hatco] hereby assumes and 
agrees to perform and fulfill all obligations 
of [Grace] attributable to the Chemical 
Business listed in Exhibit A to this 
instrument.  As used in this instrument, 
"Chemical Business" means that business 
presently conducted by the Chemical Division 
of the Hatco Group of [Grace] comprising the 
manufacture and sale of plasticisers and 
synthetic lubricants at a principal 
manufacturing location at Fords, New Jersey.  
For purposes of this instrument, "Chemical 
Business" does not include the business of 
purchase and resale of oxo-alcohols conducted 
by such Chemical Division, or any interest of 
[Grace] in Grace Petro-chemicals, Inc. or its 
undivided one-half interest in Oxochem 
Enterprise. 
  2.  [Hatco] hereby agrees to indemnify 
[Grace] and to save and hold [Grace] harmless 
from and against any and all damage, 
liability, loss, cost or deficiency 
(including, but not limited to, reasonable 
attorneys' fees and other costs and expenses 
incident to proceedings or investigations of 
the defense of any claim) arising out of or 
resulting from any failure by [Hatco] duly to 
perform or fullfill any agreement set forth 
in this instrument." 
  
 
 Exhibit A of the assumption agreement provided the  
 
following: 
 
 "Assumed Liabilities and Obligations [By Hatco] 
 
 The following liabilities and obligations of 
[Grace] attributable to the Chemical 
Business: 
  (a)  liabilities of the Hatco Chemical 
Division of [Grace] reflected in, reserved 
against or noted on the Closing Net 
Statement, other than Excluded Liabilities; 
 and 
  (b)  the following obligations and 
liabilities existing on the date of the 
Closing, or in the case of those described in 
clause (iv), arising thereafter, whether or 
not they are reflected in, reserved against 
or noted on the Closing Net Statement: 
  (i)  obligations with respect to sales 
orders accepted by the Chemical Business, 
other than Excluded Liabilities; 
  (ii)  obligations for goods and services 
ordered by the Chemical Business, other than 
Excluded Liabilities; 
  (iii)  liabilities and obligations with 
respect to capital expenditures described in 
any Request for Capital Appropriation 
approved in accordance with [Grace's] 
customary procedures by the management of the 
Chemical Business, or any management group of 
[Grace] senior thereto; 
  (iv)  other obligations and liabilities 
arising in the ordinary course of the 
Chemical Business, whether prior to or after 
the date of the Closing, other than Excluded 
Liabilities; 
  (v)  other liabilities and obligations 
of which Alex Kaufman or David G. Seabrook 
has actual present personal knowledge and 
awareness at the date of the Sale Agreement, 
other than Excluded Liabilities; 
  (vi)  other liabilities and obligations 
which do not exceed $5,000 per item and 
$50,000 in the aggregate, other than Excluded 
Liabilities. 
  
  All terms defined in the Sale Agreement 
have the same meaning in this agreement.  The 
following are the Excluded Liabilities, as 
defined in the Sale Agreement: 
  `Excluded Liabilities' means the 
following liabilities and obligations of 
[Grace] attributable to the Chemical Business 
for all periods ending on or prior to the 
date of the Closing:  (a) all liabilities for 
taxes, including without limitation income 
taxes, (except federal, state and local 
payroll and withholding taxes for the pay 
period which includes the date of the 
Closing, to the extent not paid by [Grace], 
provided an accrual in such amount shall be 
made in the Closing Net Amount) (b) notes and 
accounts payable to other groups, divisions 
or other units or subsidiaries or affiliates 
of [Grace], other than trade accounts payable 
arising from the purchase of goods, (c) 
liabilities against which [Grace] is 
effectively insured, without regard to any 
applicable deductible amounts, (d) product 
liabilities, including without limitation 
liabilities for personal injury, with respect 
to merchandise sold or shipped prior to the 
date of the Closing, (e) liabilities and 
obligations arising from claims asserted by 
any employee or former employee with respect 
to injury, sickness, disease or death or 
under any disability of workmen's 
compensation laws, (f) liabilities for which 
the corresponding assets are prepaid expenses 
and deferred charges, the benefit of which 
cannot be effectively transferred to [Hatco], 
(g) liabilities and obligations arising from 
claims asserted by any of the former owners 
or managers of any predecessor company, any 
portion of the business or assets of which is 
included in the Chemical Business or the 
Chemical Assets, and (h) the liabilities 
specifically described in the schedule to 
this Exhibit." 
 
 
  
 The schedule to Exhibit A of the assumption agreement  
 
provided the following: 
 
 "Excluded Liabilities [i.e., Those Retained By Grace] 
 
 1.  Alleged pollution of Sling Tail Brook on 
or about May 31, 1977. 
 2.  Canton v. Buffalo Tank, et al., Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Middlessex County, 
Docket L-4354-77. 
 3.  Potential claim by Norman Bresee for 
personal injury incurred at the Chemical 
plant in 1976. 
 4.  Liloia v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 
Inc., et al., Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Essex County, Docket L-44267-76." 
  
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn. 
No. 94-5276 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting. 
 
 
 I concur in the decision to vacate the district court's 
judgment in favor of Hatco on its claim for contribution from 
Grace.  I agree that the district court incorrectly applied 
federal rather than New York law to interpret the meaning of the 
ambiguous provisions in the sales agreement governing Hatco's 
responsibility for liabilities arising out of Grace's prior 
operation of its "chemical business" on the real property Hatco 
purchased.  See Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206 (3d 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1696 (1995).  I respectfully 
disagree, however, with the Court's conclusion that New York law 
requires the applicable provisions of the sales agreement to be 
construed as a release rather than a promise to indemnify.  I 
believe that these provisions are also ambiguous as to whether 
the parties intended to release or indemnify Grace against such 
liabilities.  Indeed, Hatco's release is Grace's indemnity.  
Thus, I believe their characterization as a release or an 
indemnity is a question of fact that should be decided by the 
district court in the first instance. 
 New York law is not a model of clarity in 
distinguishing releases from agreements to indemnify.  Compare 
Structural Painting Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 451 N.Y.S.2d 
875, 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) with Walsh v. Morse Diesel, Inc., 
533 N.Y.S.2d 80, 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).  In New York, as 
  
elsewhere, a polluter seeking indemnity against the cost of 
abating its pollution must establish an unmistakable intent to 
indemnify as well as the extent of the indemnification by clear 
evidence.  Heinbach v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 553 N.E.2d 
242, 246 (N.Y. 1990) (citations omitted).  New York law, on the 
other hand, allows a releasee to establish intent to release by a 
mere "expression of a present intention to renounce a claim."  
Carpenter v. Machold, 447 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) 
(citation omitted).  Moreover, once a document construed as a 
release is held to be ambiguous, the burden of proving the kinds 
of harm that are not subject to the release shifts to the 
releasor.  Structural Painting, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 876.  
 Unfortunately, the uncertainty that arises in applying 
these distinctions to disputes among two or more polluters of a 
single site over payment of the cost of abating contamination 
each has contributed to seems to me likely to increase the 
already staggering transactional costs of CERCLA litigation.  I 
am especially reluctant to hold, as a matter of law, that New 
York would construe an agreement like the one before us as a 
release if, as the Court indicates, it introduces the factor of 
who acts first into the process of distinguishing agreements of 
release from promises to indemnify.  See Majority Op. at 11.  
This could import into CERCLA litigation an incentive for a 
polluter to delay the start of clean up lest this publicly 
responsible act may prove privately costly.  Thus, I believe 
CERCLA's goal of expeditious environmental cleanup will be better 
served by interpreting provisions in ambiguous agreements for 
  
allocation of the cost of abating pollution among polluters as 
agreements of indemnity rather than agreements of release, when 
applicable local law makes that possible. 
 Accordingly, though I concur in the Court's mandate 
remanding this case to the district court for reconsideration of 
Hatco's claim for contribution under New York rather than federal 
common law, I would also leave the district court free to decide, 
in the first instance, whether the parties intended an agreement 
of release or one of indemnity.12 
                     
12
.  I agree with the Court that additional evidence may be 
needed on remand concerning Kaufman's and Seabrook's knowledge of 
the extent to which the site was polluted before the sale.  In 
addition, I note my full agreement with the scholarly analysis 
the Court adduces to support its rejection of Grace's contention 
that it has a Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury 
trial on its CERCLA claims. 
  
 
